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MEMORANDUM FOR: Distribution List


Subject: Chemical Warfare (CW) Agent Exposure Planning Guidance

1. Combatant commanders have requested guidance to protect their troops, workers, and assets while working in a chemically, biologically, or radiologically contaminated environment. Guidance on militarily acceptable CW agent exposure is seen as an essential first step in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure rapid restoration of operations. Guidance must be firmly based on agent exposure that may cause operationally relevant performance decrements. This refers to observable manifestations of adverse health effects resulting from temporary and short-term (acute) exposures to a CW agent during military operations. Guidance must also comply with the Joint Staff policy memorandum for deployment health surveillance and readiness.<sup>1</sup>
2. Data on operationally relevant health effects need to be developed and evaluated to establish acceptable exposure limits. We are supporting an OSD-led group that is accelerating and coordinating DOD research efforts on the effects of low-level CW agent exposure. This research, expected to last from 5 to 7 years, will assist in defining the CW agent concentration ranges of physiological and toxicological significance.
3. Interim guidance is provided for limiting acute exposures to CW agents until the physiological and toxicological effects are better understood. This guidance, executable with current military field detectors, will assist the joint force commanders and Services in protecting the health of deployed forces by minimizing cases of incidental exposure to CW agents (Enclosure A). It also establishes interim guidelines to decontaminate military equipment, aircraft, and vessels during combat operations and verify the asset's availability for use by unprotected personnel (Enclosure B).
4. Nothing in this guidance should be interpreted as directive in nature. The joint force commander should evaluate, on a case-by-case basis, the consequences of implementing the enclosed guidance and the effect on the overall risk to warfighters, civilians under the protection of the commander, or

the successful outcome of a critical mission. The enclosed interim guidance will be reevaluated and updated, as research results or improvements in fielded detection equipment become available. Final guidance will be developed upon completion of the appropriate research and further evaluation of DOD policy objectives.

5. The Joint Staff point of contact is Captain Timothy Lindstrom, USN; J-5, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Division; (703) 697-6187; e-mail: [timothy.lindstrom@js.pentagon.mil](mailto:timothy.lindstrom@js.pentagon.mil).

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



Enclosure

**JAMES A. HAWKINS**  
**Maj Gen, USAF**  
**Vice Director, Joint Staff**

Reference:

- 1 MCM-0006-02, 1 February 2002, "Updated Procedures for Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness"

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## ENCLOSURE A

### PROTECTION OF FORCES AGAINST CW AGENT EXPOSURE

1. This interim guidance applies to US military forces and other than US forces (OTUSF) personnel that support US military forces. For the purpose of implementing the guidance in this enclosure, the term "commanders" refers to those personnel at all levels of command of a military unit.
2. Effective immediately, the following constitutes interim joint guidance for chemical warfare (CW) agent exposure.
  - a. Commanders will ensure US military personnel, DOD essential civilians and contractors, and other personnel that support US military operations are using appropriate protective equipment when operating near any detectable CW agent, where agents are suspected, or when participating in decontamination operations. Guidance for sustaining operations in a contaminated environment is found in Joint Publication 3-11, July 2000, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*.
  - b. In response to a suspected or actual CW incident, commanders will ensure the deployment health surveillance and readiness documentation requirements are met IAW MCM 0006-02. Documentation must include identifying Service members that are exposed or possibly exposed to CW agents (protected or unprotected), their location and time in the hazard area, and all monitoring results (to include those within standards).
  - c. Commanders may reduce protective postures and allow unprotected military personnel, DOD essential civilians, and contractors to operate in proximity of formerly contaminated material or equipment only after using currently fielded and available technologies to validate that either decontamination procedures or weathering have reduced hazards from material and equipment to non-detectable levels. One or more detectors from the enclosed list (Enclosure C) will be used in this process.
  - d. Commanders will periodically monitor personnel for physiological signs of CW agent effects during and following any possible CW agent exposure. If CW agents are detected, exceeding the levels annotated in Enclosure C, or previously unexposed personnel begin to exhibit physiological signs of agent exposure following unmasking procedures, commanders will take appropriate NBC protective measures. Commanders will ensure that personnel who exhibit physiological signs of agent exposure receive appropriate medical attention.

## ENCLOSURE B

### DECONTAMINATION OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY ASSETS AND CARGO

1. This interim guidance applies to US military forces and other than US forces (OTUSF) personnel supporting US military forces executing or supporting strategic mobility operations.
2. Effective immediately, the following standards constitute interim guidance to combatant commanders supporting the decontamination of strategic mobility assets, equipment, and cargo exposed to CW agents. Guidance for the retrograde movement of formerly contaminated cargo and equipment is covered in Field Manual 3-11.34, *Multiservice Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airfields*, Appendix I (also known as MCWP3.37.5, NTTP 3-11.23, or AFTTP(1) 3-2.33).
  - a. Commanders at all levels of command conducting military operations within an area of responsibility (AOR) where CW agents have been used are required to monitor and manage operational exposure to CW agent contamination. The commander's contamination avoidance principles should be consistent with Joint Publication 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments*. In the execution of the force's mission, all commanders should conduct a risk assessment, balancing exposure to contamination and other risks in light of joint task force priorities. This is essential to operational risk management.
  - b. Decontamination requirements may exceed the organic crew capability of a plane or ship and therefore, assistance from the geographic (normally the supported) combatant commander may be required. Decontamination operations should be done as soon as possible and preferably before the asset leaves the geographic combatant commander's AOR and is placed back into strategic lift operations. In the event strategic mobility assets become contaminated, USTRANSCOM will coordinate with the geographic combatant commander to decontaminate the asset or allow the asset to weather to negligible levels as soon as possible.
  - c. Contamination is defined as liquid, solid, or vapor residue from chemical warfare attacks that is detectable using fielded point detectors. Negligible levels are defined as below detectable levels of currently fielded chemical agent point detectors. The objective is to ensure continuation of the flow of troops and equipment during hostilities that involve the employment of CW agents, while ensuring the formerly contaminated assets do not represent an immediate and significant health risk to unprotected military personnel or DOD essential civilians or contractors.
  - d. Consistent with JP 3-11, supported combatant and operational commanders have the responsibility to detect and decontaminate those aircraft

or ships that have been confirmed to be contaminated with CW agents, thus ensuring the safe operation of these assets by unprotected personnel. Confirmation of CW agent decontamination or weathering is when trained personnel cannot identify readings of CW agents on the asset using currently fielded detectors (see Enclosure C), and previously unexposed personnel in proximity to decontaminated equipment do not exhibit physiological signs of agent exposure following unmasking procedures. Cargo and equipment will be decontaminated based on the mission-critical nature of those items. Decontamination operations should be executed as far forward as possible to minimize the spread of contamination. Commanders issuing orders executing decontamination operations should consider the warfighting criticality of returning these assets to operation against other contaminated assets to establish priorities for equipment decontamination.

e. Operational commanders will consider all measures possible consistent with mission priorities and operational risk, to debark uncontaminated or decontaminated cargo, equipment, and personnel at uncontaminated seaports and airbases. Other procedures such as the use of protective clothing, protective covers, and warehouses, will be used to minimize the impact of CW agent contamination.

3. Combatant commanders will use the following guidance to support development of policies and concepts of operation to sustain operations and restore operational capability to strategic mobility assets supporting their areas of operation and to transload formerly contaminated equipment and cargo.

a. For operating strategic mobility assets within the theater of operations, operational commanders will ensure that strategic mobility assets and cargo have been decontaminated or are allowed to weather to negligible levels measured with currently fielded CW agent point detectors. All assets and cargo will be appropriately marked as formerly contaminated items, as per FM 3-11.34, Appendix I. These measures will significantly reduce (if not eliminate) the transfer of CW contamination to other areas of operation within the theater. These measures also minimize the risk of acute exposure to those military or civilian personnel operating on or around the strategic lift asset.

b. In the event Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) assets become contaminated with chemical warfare agents, the planes will not be utilized even if decontaminated to negligible levels, as they are not equipped to be operated by personnel wearing individual protective equipment. Current USTRANSCOM policy states that the CRAFT assets will not operate into contaminated airfields, but may proceed to clean airfields despite the threat of chemical or biological attack. The Commander, US Transportation Command, will make this determination on a case-by-case basis. If CRAF aircraft do not depart before attack on airfield, crews will don protective equipment and enter protective shelters until assessments of contamination can be initiated. In the event

CRAF assets are contaminated in a theater of operations, restoration measures following military operations will ensure these assets can be safely returned to the United States (if return of these assets is desired).

c. In the event that DOD-contracted commercial sealift ships become contaminated with chemical warfare agents, the ships can be utilized after decontamination to negligible levels, as long as the crew has individual protective equipment and detectors onboard and are trained on their use. Current USTRANSCOM policy states that sealift assets will not proceed into contaminated ports, but will stand by in safe waters or may be rerouted to clean ports despite the threat of chemical or biological attack. Commander, US Transportation Command, will make this determination on a case-by-case basis. If DOD-contracted commercial sealift ships do not depart before an attack on port, crews will don protective equipment and enter protective shelters until assessments of contamination can be initiated.

d. Due to concerns of low-level agent exposure, these measures may not be sufficient for transiting formerly contaminated strategic lift assets and cargo through supporting countries. Therefore, commanders should take every effort to transit assets through US territories, rather than foreign ports to CONUS air or seaports of debarkation in order to maintain the flow of troops and equipment. If the situation requires formerly contaminated assets to transit supporting country air or seaports, then mobility planners should request appropriate authorization from supporting countries.

e. Strategic lift assets returning to CONUS in support of continuing military operations will be thoroughly decontaminated (as defined in JP 3-11, pages III-9 through III-12 (e.g., extended weathering)) prior to arrival to CONUS A/SPODs. Formerly contaminated strategic mobility assets will return to DOD-controlled airbases and seaport facilities. These assets and/or formerly contaminated equipment may not be released from US government control during ongoing military operations. These measures will ensure formerly contaminated assets and cargo do not present an operational health risk to military and civilian personnel operating on or near the asset for short duration. They will also significantly reduce the risk of any low-level exposure to non-DOD personnel.

f. Additional guidance will be developed to address national and international decontamination policies. These policies will address intra-theater and inter-theater movement through other country airbases and seaports and the return of formerly contaminated strategic lift assets to CONUS as part of post-conflict operations. Formerly contaminated strategic lift assets will not be released from government control until this national guidance is established.

ENCLOSURE C

CURRENT CHEMICAL AGENT POINT DETECTORS

<b><u>Detection Device</u></b>	<b><u>Acceptable Concentration</u></b>
Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM)/Improved CAM	Zero bars
M256A1 Chemical Agent Detector Kit	No detection
ABC-M8 Chemical Agent Detector Paper	No color change
M9 Chemical Agent Detector Paper	No color change
M8A1 Automatic Chemical Agent Alarm	No detection/audible alarm
M-90 Automatic Agent Detector (AMAD)	No detection/audible alarm
Chemical Agent Point Detection System (CAPDS), MK21, MOD1	No detection/audible alarm
Improved (Chemical Agent) Point Detection System (IPDS)	No detection/audible alarm
M22 Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Alarm (ACADA)	No detection or identification of chemical agent
Mk 27 Mod 0 Shipboard ACADA	No detection or identification of chemical agent
Joint Chemical Agent Detector	No detection or identification of chemical agent